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Ethno-national Identity of the Russians in the Multiethnic Environment: a Case-study of the Krasnodar Region

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is analysis of ethno-national self-consciousness of the Russian population of Krasnodar Territory. Main factors are discussed that condition the specific character of ethno-social and ethno-cultural processes in the region: polyethnic composition of population of the territory, migration factor, Cossacks as a special ethno-cultural and social community, the specific character of social and economic position of areas of the territory, and the effect of regional elites on interethnic relationships. Based on empirical studies conducted among the territory's residents, particularities of ethnic identity, condition of ethnic solidarity, people's readiness for interethnic contacts, and a complex of ethnic feelings are revealed. A comparative analysis of sociological research data of 2005 and 2013 has been conducted and the dynamic aspect of ethno-national self-consciousness of the Russian population of the region is represented. It has been determined that the condition of ethno-national self-consciousness of the Russians fosters sustaining of a positive image of their nation and defines tolerant interethnic attitudes.

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1. Introduction

The process of globalization into which Russia gets involved does not exclude social, economic and ethno-cultural originality of its regions. When stating the variability of this general phenomenon, scientists increasingly

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use the notion "glocalization" meaning a process of adapting global economic practices to local conditions. Accordingly, ethno-social and ethno-political processes acquire regional particularity in Russia of today. Krasnodar territory is a polyethnic region where a certain cultural-historic and ethno-cultural unity has been formed during sociogenesis process on the common natural and landscape basis.

A number of factors conditioning the specific way ethno-social and and ethno-cultural processes take place in the territory can be singled out.

First, this is the *polyethnical composition of the population*. Historically polyethnic regional community of Krasnodar territory was formed by indigenous Adyg (Circassian) population and asynchronous waves of migration movement of Cossacks, mass of so-called non-resident population – descendants of Russian and Ukrainian ethnoses. Kuban region became the place of historical residence and ethnic indigenization for such ethnoses as the Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Moldavians, Estonians and a range of other ethnic groups. Over several centuries in conditions of intensive interethnic interactions, a special ethno-cultural environment was formed that is characterized by a rather high potential of tolerance between representatives of various ethnoses.

As of January 1, 2013, the population of Krasnodar territory amounted to 5330181 people, of which the urban population numbers 53,5%, and rural one – 46,5%. The territory ranks 3rd in population size among the RF subjects, while being characterized by a high population density – 70,46 people/sq. km and by quite a varied ethnic composition.

Second, this is *political migration* that produces a considerable effect on the ethno-demographic balance in the region. For this region, a high migration level is characteristic: in 2012, 176884 people arrived in the territory, 117006 of them being from beyond the region, and 70668 people left the region. The migration growth was 46338 people, 10327 people of them coming from CIS countries (Chislennost' naselenija Krasnodarskogo kraja, 2012). Just like in other regions of Southern Federal District, in Krasnodar region, the migration growth is provided at the expense of ethnic migrants, which is reflected in change of the population's ethnic composition.

Size of some ethnic minorities went up. This applies to Armenians, whose quantity – 281680 people – increased as compared to the previous census (274 566 people in 2002). The quantity of Gypsies in the inter-census period grew from 10873 people up to 12920 people. The census of 2010 also registered a slight increase in Kurds and Yazidi: the quantity of Kurds increased from 5022 people up to 5899 people, that of Yazidi – from 4441 people up to 5023 people. The census of 2010 reflected the labor migration growth trend, in particular, from the Central Asia – 3469 Uzbeks (there were 2210 people in 2002) and 1853 Tajiks (they were 1179 in 2002).

Krasnodar territory has always been at the center of various migration flows so the problems of attitude to migrants of the recipient community, migration adjustment issues have always been the focus of attention both of the authorities and of the public. So, as the experts believe, the vector of attitude to ethnic migration is gradually changing in the latest years, from sheer migrantophobia and often non-constitutional attempts to resist uncontrolled migration – towards purposeful use of labor migrants, first of all, in large construction projects (Tishkova, Hoperskoj & Stepanova, 2013).

The next factor conditioning the specific character of ethno-social relationships in the territory are *the Cossacks*. So, in the Statute of Krasnodar territory, it is stipulated that Krasnodar territory is a historical area where the Kuban Cossacks formed (Ustav Krasnodarskogo kraja (s izmenenijami i dopolnenijami), 2014). In the "Conception of state policy of Krasnodar territory towards the Kuban Cossacks", the Cossacks are determined as an ethno-cultural social community of people, the historical area of formation of which is Krasnodar territory (Konceptija gosudarstvennoj politiki Krasnodarskogo kraja v otnoshenii kubanskogo kazachestva, 2011). Thus the thesis about the Kuban Cossacks being an indigenous people of the region is consolidated.

In the 1990s, revival of the Cossacks became a substantial factor of political and sociocultural development of the region. Since the 2000s, the administrative control over Cossack organizations is tightened, which on the one hand granted the Cossacks a special status at the regional level and on the other hand – furthered the loss of quite a part of independence in conducting the cultural policy (Kol'ba, 2011).

During the census of 2010, 5261 people were defined as Cossacks, while 17542 people – in 2002. The official size of Kuban Cossack troops was 42320 people in 2010. Such difference between personal identity of Cossacks and the official data is the evidence of most Cossacks not identifying themselves as a separate ethnic group (Otchet Atamana Kubanskogo kazach'ego vojska kazach'ego generala N.A Doludy, 2014).

Ethno-national relationships in the territory are conditioned by *social-economic factors*. First of all, this is population life quality polarization among administrative divisions of the territory: high performances in Krasnodar and the resort area of the Black Sea coast, and low ones in some agricultural areas of the territory.

According to the data of 2013, the municipality (Krasnodar) belongs to the group with above average development level, 11 municipalities – to the average development group, 27 municipalities – to the below average development group, and 5 municipalities are referred to the low development level group (Peronenko, 2013). The big gap between high and low development level municipalities persists. In 9 areas of the territory only, the percentage of population whose income is smaller than the subsistence minimum is less than the average in the territory level of 13%.

In Tuapse area, there are just 2,7% of the poor, in Sochi – 4,9%, in Gelendzhik – 9,3%, in Krasnodar and Timashevsk area – 10,1% in each, in Novorossiysk – 10,8%. However, in 12 municipalities, the proportion of the poor population exceeds 20%: in Apsheronsk area (27,7%), in Novopokrovskaya area (27,5%), in Tbilisi area (26,2%), in Krymsk (26,1%) and Belaya Glina (25%) area.

The existing opposition of the Kuban steppe population and that of the Black sea coast can be pointed out. The residents of the Kuban Cossack villages separate themselves from the population of the Central Russia, while the resort coast is separated into the locals and the holidaymakers, with the residents of coastal areas not associating themselves with the Kuban rather often and not considering themselves to be a part of the Cossack region. In particular, when in 2010 there appeared information in the Internet about possible separation of the coastal areas from Krasnodar territory for creating the new Black Sea territory, the population of these areas voiced their support of the idea actively.

In our opinion, such factor as *effect of the regional elite* on the interethnic relationships sphere deserves special attention. Within the research of 2004-2005 (Project of the Russian Foundation for the Humanities, 2004-2005, No. 04-03-38013a/Yu "Particularities of the ethnic self-consciousness of the Russians in a polyethnic region"), the ideological context for categorizing the identity of the Russian population of the territory was analyzed, for which the main ideologemes and representation in the political texts were considered. We should mention that the political discourse is to a certain extent capable of not only forming the ethnic identity content for the population of the region, but of setting the trend of international attitudes towards tolerance or intolerance and even extremism.

The political discourse of the territory was characterized by the following ideologemes in 2004-2005:

- 1) the ideologeme of subdivision of population of the territory into indigenous and non-indigenous ones, with the Russian population dominating compulsorily;
- 2) the ideologeme of regional sociocultural community the "Kubans";
- 3) the ideologeme of a special role the Cossacks play in maintaining law and order in the territory;
- 4) the ideologeme of absence of the ethnic discrimination in the territory that is grounded by the fact of representatives of a multitude of ethnic groups living here.

All in all, the basis for political discourse is ethnic categorization of subjects of social actions, perception of ethnic minorities as a threat to stability in the region, which furthered creation of a hyperpositive ethno-national identity of the Russian population at the expense of the ethnic "aliens".

As for change in the political discourse, the analysis of main ideologemes in the sphere of interethnic relationships in 2012-2013 allows singling out the following ideologemes:

- 1) the Cossacks are recognized as a separate nation;
- 2) the Adygs (Circassians) are an indigenous population of the territory;
- 3) migration again poses a threat to the ethno-demographic balance having formed;
- 4) the main threat is represented by the Caucasian nations;
- 5) in the sphere of migration policy, the necessity of restrictive and prohibitive administrative measures and total police control is acknowledged (Rech' gubernatora Kubani o kazach'ej policii, migrantah i sud'bah Rodiny, 2012).

On balance, one can say that no drastic change in the rhetorics of the regional authorities as for the range of ethnic problems has happened. However, the experts point out that new accents are registered in speeches as delivered by the governor of the territory, and representatives of other nations living in the territory for a long time are accepted as equal participants of the regional community. Thus, in the ethno-political discourse of Krasnodar territory, there takes place a "transition from the state-forming people strategy to the strategy of interethnic consolidation of the old residents as a counterweight to the "new" migrants, and a movement to expanding the social basis for ideology of the Kuban originality ideology" (Tishkova, Hoperskoj & Stepanova, 2013, p. 52).

These are the general features of ethno-social situation in the region within the context of which the identity is constructed and the Russian population of the territory realizes "themselves" and "others".

Studying the structural components of self-consciousness of an ethnos allows determining the internal processes of mobilization and self-organization of the ethnic group. The following elements are included into the

structure of an ethnos's self-consciousness: ethnic identification, ideas of culture, language, territory, history, statehood of the people – the "we" image", a complex of ethno-national feelings, a system of ethnic stereotypes, and realization of national-economic interests.

Let us discuss the change taking place in the self-consciousness of the Russian population of the polyethnic region.

2. Research methodology

The empirical basis is results of sociological research conducted in Krasnodar territory by the questionnaire survey method. The data have been obtained during implementation of two projects: the Russian Foundation for the Humanities, 2004-2005, No. 04-03-38013a/Yu "Particularities of the ethnic self-consciousness of the Russians in a polyethnic region" (sampling of 1200 people) and the Russian Foundation for the Humanities, 2012-2013, No. 12-23-01000 a(m) "Particularities of social identity in the context of modern integration processes in the union of Belarus and Russia" (sampling of 1200 people). The object of study was Russian population aged over 18 and living in Krasnodar territory. Sampling had target nature with elements of random selection of residential settlements and respondents. When selecting the respondents, social-demographic attributes (sex, age, education) and place of residence (urban or rural one) were used as determining ones. The confidence interval of the sampling was 95%, with $\pm 3\%$ error.

3. Research outcomes

Ethnic identity is the motivation-cognitive core of self-consciousness of an ethnos, one that mediates interactions within the group and between groups. Stability of the identity, its positive character and significance act as indicators of social feeling of the ethnos, of ethno-mobilization processes. As a rule, ethnic identity is integrated into other manifold identities in the human perception and is mostly not the dominating one at the individual level in more or less calm social and political situation.

In the study of the Russian population of Krasnodar territory in 2004-2005, the questionnaire included a block of questions targeted directly at revealing the ethnic identity type, and a similar block of questions was included into the 2013 questionnaire. Types of ethnic identity were studied using a modified methodical development of G.U. Soldatova. This is what the proportion of various ethnic identity types looks like (Table 1).

Table 1. Types of ethnic identity, %

<i>Ethnic identity type</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2005</i>
Identity according to type of norm	64	67
Ethno-egoism	9	12
Ethno-isolationism	11	8
Ethnic indifference	9	7
Ethno-fanaticism	5	4
Ethno-nihilism	2	2
Total	100	100

The predominating type of ethnic identity of the Russian population was the "norm" one both in 2005 and in 2012, which may be conditioned by the quantitative domination of the Russian ethnos in ethnic composition of the population of the territory, as well as by a relatively calm situation in the sphere of interethnic relationships in the region.

Next comes hyperidentity in such forms as ethno-egoism and ethno-isolationism. In 2005, there was 12% of respondents having the "ethno-egoism" identity type, while they were 9% in 2012. This type can be expressed in different ways, ranging from harmless wording like "our people" up to clear irritation in communication with representatives of other ethnic groups. Meanwhile, ethno-isolationism (11% in 2012 and 8% 2005) is already manifested in seeking to ensure "purity" of ethnos, being a kind of xenophobia. The most extreme form putting the interests and rights of the people above rights of a person – ethno-fanaticism – is expressed by a minor part of the

respondents: 5% in 2012 and 4% in 2005.

Relatively low figures of hyperidentity give evidence about interethnic consensus existing in the region and about readiness of most respondents for interethnic contacts.

There are few respondents either denying the ethnic factor or displaying indifference to it. Ethnic indifference related to indifference to the ethnic factor in the individual's social life is expressed in 9% of the surveyed in 2012 and in 7% – in 2005. Ethno-nihilism, when individuals leave their own identity and look for other identification criteria, is only expressed in 2% of the surveyed both in 2012 and in 2005.

Thus, domination of the norm type ethnic identity is a kind of warranty of maintenance and support of stable international relationships in the territory.

4. Discussion of the research outcomes

Let us now turn to analyzing individual aspects of manifestation of ethno-national self-consciousness in the respondents.

Ethnic solidarity. In order to measure ethnic solidarity, the questionnaire included the following judgment: "Must a modern nation feel a part of a nationality?", and the statement "I never forget I am Russian" was included into the questionnaire for measuring the degree of involvement into ethnicity.

Table 2. Ethnic solidarity, %

Variants of answers:	2012	2005
Currently, a nation does not have to feel a part of a national group.	38,9	32
Currently, a nation needs to feel a part of a national group.	39	58
I am at a loss to answer	22,1	10
Total	100	100

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question "Can you say about yourself "I never forget I am Russian"?", %

Variants of answers	2012	2005
Yes	74,8	59,7
No	13,3	27
I am at a loss to answer	11,9	13,3
Total	100	100

In 2005, both the ethnic solidarity level and the degree of involvement into ethnicity were high, with traceable differences in opinions of the respondents coming from different areas of the territory. For instance, the data obtained for Abinsk area showed a high level of ethnic solidarity among the Russian population: for 68% of the surveyed, the feeling of belonging to an ethnic group was compulsory, and the degree of involvement into ethnicity was also high – 70% of the respondents "never forget they are Russian". Krasnodar had similar performances: 67% and 69%, respectively. The same performances were a bit lower in Shcherbinovsky and Tuapse areas, towns of Goryachiy Klyuch and Korenovsk: the feeling of belonging to an ethnic group was compulsory for 60% of the respondents, and the degree of involvement into ethnicity was 44%, which is conditioned by a stable situation in the sphere of interethnic relationships.

Particularities of tools and sampling in the research have not allowed us to compare data for various areas of the territory in 2012, but they enabled us to see the general trends. So, the ethnic solidarity level went down considerably, and almost equal proportion can be singled out among the respondents: those believing in compulsory solidarity with the ethnic community (39%) and ones for whom this kind of solidarity is not relevant (38,9%). However, involvement into ethnicity has grown significantly: as compared to 59,7% in 2005, it was 74,8% in 2012,

which may be explained by close connection of public and ethnic identities in Russians.

Alongside with this, the danger of isolationist attitudes and ethnic intolerance growth remains. The proportion of radically minded respondents is not high – in 2005, the percentage of respondents supporting the motto "Russia for the Russians" in this or that form amounted to some 24%, and it was around 30% in 2012, – but the range of moods capable of turning into intolerant attitudes under certain circumstances is much broader (the development indicator is the "Russian question"). They are moods of hurt dignity, feelings of loss and damage (Table 4).

Table 4. Ideas of the "Russian question", % (the total is over 100%, as multiple choice of answers was possible)

Variants of answers	2012	2005
A lower level of living as compared to other nations	28,5	31
The Russians departing from the RF republics	15,4	33,3
Scaling down of industry, lack of jobs	25,8	22
Dissolution of agricultural farms where Russians were employed	14,5	31
Complicated placement for a prestigious job	12,2	28
Development of grassroots nationalism	11,2	14,8
Lack of integration of the Russians, lack of a leader	22,1	42
There is no such question	7,2	7,4
I am at a loss to answer	34,3	28

Accordingly, any aggravation of social-economic problems can trigger the growth of interethnic tension. Attitudes towards migrants can be indicative of probable growth of intolerance and xenophobia in the population (Table 5).

Table 5. Attitude of the respondents to migrants, %

Variants of answers	2012	2005
entirely positive	4,4	3,7
rather positive	15,3	27,2
rather negative	31,4	43,1
sharply negative	13,8	11
indifferent – this is not interesting for me	35	13
Total	100	100

In 2005, the attitude to migrants in various areas of the territory depended on the migration situation: in this case, Abinsk area is so illustrative where sharp aversion of the local population to migrants (up to 45%) was registered due to a significant flow of migrants. In the resort area (Tuapse area, Goryachiy Klyuch), where worsening of international relationships would affect the flow of holidaymakers, the aversion to migrants figures were lower.

Among the main motives of aversion to migrants, the following were named in 2005: they "occupy job positions, provoke unemployment" – 25%, "buy up our lands" – 17%, "behave brassily and aggressively" – 14%, "pose a threat to our safety" – 13%, "they are drug-dealers" – 11%, they "commit most crimes" – 9%, "bribe the police and the authorities" – 7%, "oppress the Russians" – 4%. In 2012, this question was asked as open-form one, so it is impossible to trace the percentage proportion of answers, yet the rhetorics of the respondents remains the same: "occupy job positions", "behave obnoxiously", "provoke disturbance and conflicts", "raise the crime rate" etc. The arguments used by the respondents to ground reasons for the negative attitude to migrants are clearly borrowed from the media and the official statements of the authorities in most cases.

It is important to point out that the content of ethnic images cannot serve as a pillar of behavior forecasts, as

there is a certain distance between the ethnic attitudes and actual behavior. Despite the high figures of the negative attitude to migrants, the majority of the surveyed (up to 70% in 2005 and up to 65% in 2012) are not committed to violent conflict actions but are interested in maintaining the interethnic consensus in the territory. This is clearly manifested in flexible and situational character of the area of sharp interethnic boundaries, in most respondents having no negative experience in interethnic contacts, in value orientation to keeping social-economic and international stability in the region. The Russian population's commitment to interethnic consensus is also confirmed by the data about behavior of the respondents in situations of occurrence and maintenance of social interethnic contacts, as well as by aggressiveness figures at personal and group levels. Comparison of motives determining the behavior in situations of the respondents' interacting with representatives of other ethnoses allows revealing the predominant behavior model oriented to a certain situation (Table 6).

Table 6. Motives determining the behavior in the situation of interethnic interaction, % (the total is over 100%, as multiple choice of answers was possible)

Motives	2012	2005
My idea about the people of this nationality	27,9	16
Personal communication experience	19,2	19
My own motives and interests	36,6	38
Expediency of communication	41,1	44
Widespread behavior patterns used by the majority	2,8	20
Experience of others	4,9	12
My values	10,3	21
Behavior of the people I contact	34,8	56
Social standards	16,2	31

With regard to this, the ethnic stereotypes existing as personal attitudes ("my idea about the people of this nationality") or social group attitudes ("Widespread behavior patterns"), and the attitudes picked up from the experience of other people, are less preferable than the importance of implementing one's own values, motives and interests, as well as rationalized expediency. Thus, the pragmatic interests prevail over the possible emotional reactions and affective attitudes.

In situations of direct conflict clash with representatives of another nationality, the respondents tend either to active intolerance in line with the "eye for eye" principle – "in such situations, one must respond similarly", or they control the display of affects and show restraint – "I have unpleasant feelings yet I keep negative emotions to myself". Less widespread are intentions to use a later action according to the "bear malice" principle, to suppress the response due to the feeling of one's weakness. The responses to a conflict situation were also considered against the instrumental aggression indicator (Table 7). The instrumental aggression being a socially motivated form of behavior implies acknowledgement of possible aggressive actions given important justification reasons.

Table 7. Motives of possible aggressive actions, % (the total is over 100%, as multiple choice answers were available for the respondents)

Motives	2012	2005
If there is a threat to my life, to life of my family, friends and close ones	80,3	78
If there is a threat to the life of a representative (the representatives) of my national group	21,5	26
If the other party should behave in an insulting manner	38,2	28
Without a certain ground, due to a bad mood, unlucky turn of events	2,3	1
If I had a negative experience of communication with a representative of this nationality	4,3	3
There can be aggressive response from my part, but it does not depend on the national affiliation of the other people	26,5	20

At the personal level, the figure of hostile aggression ("direct threat to life, family") is rather high, so is the response aggression ("response to insulting behavior"). The quantity of advocates of the extreme aggression form is on balance insignificant in the sampling, which creates potential for reducing the interethnic tension.

The proportion of identities. One of the ways to remove the accented character of ethnic affiliation is to construct new identities or to update the multiple identity. In connection to this, our study considered the proportion of state, ethnic and regional identity. The following trend was revealed: in 2005, ethnic self-definition occurs more frequently than the public and regional one, while in 2012, ethnic identity is less pronounced than the public and regional one (Table 8).

Table 8. Proportion of identity types, %

	First of all		To a certain extent		Do not feel at all	
	2012	2005	2012	2005	2012	2005
A resident of Krasnodar territory	61,1	59,8	32,6	29,7	6,3	10,6
A citizen of Russia	72,9	69,2	23,6	22,3	3,5	8,5
A representative of a certain nationality / ethnic group	45,9	75,6	42	18,7	12,1	5,7

On the whole, we can state that in mass consciousness, the ethnic and the Russian identities are not opposed but capable to complement each other. And this is quite an optimistic indicator, as the state identity in a polyethnic state cannot be based on the ethnic identity of the majority.

Ethnic boundaries. Ethnic identity is also the "main tool" using which a group succeeds in drawing reliable and noticeable ethnic boundaries. An ethnic boundary is a subjectively recognized and experienced distance viewed in the context of interethnic relationships. When boundaries are being determined, the priority lies with such categories as "parents", "language", "culture", "territory", i.e. the same ascriptive attributes on which the subjective definition of ethnonational identity is based. Religion is a factor that has been gaining distancing role among scientists and politicians lately, but at the level of mass consciousness, religion is not a priority ethnic identifier. For the most part, religious differences are reflected in everyday sphere in the clearest way, bringing differences into ways of life and behavior styles. Differences in value orientations are also most noted in daily sphere, hence they act as clearly realized boundaries. When marking differences and determining group boundaries, it is not just cultural characteristics that can matter but also the system of values, social and political orientations. In connection to this, it is essential to determine the system of value orientations capable of performing the unifying function.

For finding out macrovalue orientations of the Russian, a semi-open question was included into the questionnaire: "What is necessary for revival of your people?" (Table 9).

Table 9. Structure of macrovalue orientations, % (the total is over 100%, as multiple choice answers were available for the respondents)

Value	2012	2005
Development of the national culture of my people	49,6	47
Support of religion of my people	12,8	16,6
Development of market economy	39,9	55,9
Enhancement of natural environment	31,5	36
Ensuring of order	55,8	71,7
Consolidation of independence of the territory	18,8	29,6
Provision of interests of my people among the leading authorities of the territory	25,9	36

Such values as "development of the national culture", «Provision of interests of the people among the

authorities" find significant support with the Russian population, though not being dominant ones. Taking into consideration the interethnic relationships established in the region, they can gain ethno-mobilization meaning. The paramount life values ("enhancement of nature", "ensuring of order", "development of economy") are essentially the survival values; they have less politics to them, they are perceived by people of any nationality in a tolerant manner – they are the potential using which the relationships in the region can be stabilized.

Ethnic feelings. The structure of self-consciousness of an ethnos includes an emotional component. The character of feelings one has towards one's own ethnic group and their change reflect the dynamics of the group's image from the standpoint of its being attractive – unattractive, and they also influence the relationships with other groups (Table 10).

Table 10. Ethnic feelings, % (the total is over 100%, as multiple choice answers were available for the respondents)

Feelings	2012	2005
Feeling of being hurt and humiliated	7,7	6
Pride	57,2	50
Love for one's people	55,5	63
Shame	7,2	10
Superiority	9,4	6
Guilt	1,3	1
Admiration	13,6	12
Certainty	29,5	22
Uncertainty	5,5	6
No feelings	15,9	2

Alongside with pride, belonging to the Russian ethnos calls in the respondents the following positive emotions: love, certainty, admiration. The feeling of superiority inherent to a minor quantity of the respondents allows speaking about the absence of emotional background for ethno-centric moods. The range of negative feelings is represented by uncertainty, humility or indifference.

The analysis of the emotional component of self-consciousness of the Russians allows us to state that address to ethnicity is related not only to social and economic interests but also to the need to regain the lost dignity feeling.

5. Conclusion

The analysis of structural components of self-consciousness of the Russian population of Krasnodar territory allows making a number of conclusions:

1) The Russian population of the territory currently keeps the "normal" type of ethnic identity, which means setting and perceiving a positive image of one's people and tolerant interethnic attitudes.

2) High figures of ethnic solidarity among the Russians do not mean seeking national dominating or ethno-national mobilization.

3) The feeling of relative social deprivation existing in some respondents may under certain circumstances (aggravation of social-economic situation, nationalist declarations of the authorities and the media) grow into intolerant and isolationist attitudes. The potential of xenophobia and intolerant interethnic attitudes revealed is conditioned, first of all, by an elevated level of anxiety of the Russian population due to the inflow of ethnic migrants and the respective growth of migrantophobia. Meanwhile, distance between attitudes and actual behavior remains: the majority of the respondents are not in the mood to act violently and in a conflict manner and they are interested in maintaining the interethnic consensus in the territory.

4. When viewing the proportion of ethnic, regional and general Russian identity, the following trend has been revealed: there was change in the proportion, in 2005, ethnic identity was in the dominant position, while 2012 saw the general Russian identity coming to the foreground. With regard to this, ethnic and Russian identities are not

opposed but they are capable of complementing each other thus creating a basis for the general Russian solidarization. High performances of regional identity and interest in social-economic development of the region allow speaking about regionalization of self-consciousness of the Russians.

5. When marking differences and determining group boundaries, it is not just cultural characteristics that matter but also the system of macrovalue orientations.

6. Positive emotions prevailing in evaluation of one's own ethno-national group gives evidence about restoring the positive ethnic identity.

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